If there has to be one then no more than 6 -7 epochs. People who stayed for the worst period of the project should not be seen in the same category as option 2.
I understand the desire to reward those who were registered before, but unfortunately doing it this way only helps those who deregister and leave. Anyone who stays the two years anyway benefits nothing from this strategy - actually since it takes tokens away from the treasury it penalizes everyone who stays. And what of long term nodes that deregistered shortly before the vote, or those that just registered a few epochs before the vote? It’s hard to make it fair without getting all complex.
We should consider a different reward or incentive system, like adjust the tax system (the 5% going to treasury) so less is taken out of nodes that have been registered longer or there is some type of kickback once you are registered for so long.
Again this is just my opinion and if others think different we can adjust.
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It’s not a reward, is the expectation created in rip18. Why the people who stayed with the project during the worst time be subject to 2 year vesting ? If they deregistered after voting to mitigate risk and the re-registered for 2.0 I think is fair they get the airdrop without such long vesting.
Also I want to bring attention again to the wording used “ it takes tokens away from the treasury”. This is not true.
Regarding
Option 1 account for them
RIP-018 specifically called for a lock up period for any allocation of tokens, including darknodes. It also only allowed for nodes who were registered during the vote. So option one was designed to exactly reflect RIP-018. We just have to decide how long the lock-up, or vesting period, is.
2.0 will be different than 1.0, VPS fees may be more, rewards might be low in the beginning, there may be some political strife, market pumps, any number of events or issues which could cause a dno operator to want to deregister. Without a long vesting period, even dno that have been around awhile (or were only around for a few epochs before RIP-018) will be able to exit relatively early and take the 18k airdrop with them to the market. A vesting period will encourage nodes to weather any storms or market cycles, and treasury gets them back if they do leave.
Fair enough… still believe a shorter vesting period for option 1 is reasonable.
I really don’t get this culture of punishment or excessive control. If people were willing to weather all the uncertainty of those days to later be treated as opportunists is not great.
People who don’t want an airdrop can donate them to the treasury no one is holding them to do so.
It’s not punishment or control, it’s just safeguarding a modest treasury imo, and not everyone who was present at RIP-018 was a long term holder.
We can set option one for one year, or even word it that the vesting period will be determined by the foundation (which may end up overruling our votes anyway in some way). I’m just stating my opinion and I could be in minority.
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I’m happy to help draft the final RIP, but I don’t have access to this area. Can someone grant me access? Or is there something else I need to do?
I sent you a text in Telegram. Can you add me to the protected area?
Thank you all for your comments.
I usually don’t participate much to avoid noise but I do read all comments and feedbacks. I’m very pleased to see such a community; with great exchanges and consideration.
However I can’t help myself to agree with comments made above by @SethD
Heading into the vote, I’ll note one last time that I think it would be a mistake for the community to reward OGs instead of promoting decentralization and community growth heading into 2.0 launch. Decentralization and community momentum are the two most important items REN needs to excel at moving forward in the face of an expanding and well funded competitor set.
and this one from @Jeff .
In my experience, “best” and even “better” are often the enemy of “good enough". Keep the bond @ 100k. If this project has the potential that I think it does, a few more DNs isn’t gonna make/break anyone’s fortune. Just my (uneducated) $0.02.
Original DNO still in the game will overall benefit much more from the success of the REN 2.0 (its decentralization and ease of access) - than discussing a airdrop to compensate possible future DN - and then discuss how to attribute these airdropped to who and based on what parameters. Let’s keep something simple; let’s move to a REN 2.0; let’s on-board more DN as soon as possible. Competition won’t wait for REN.
I would be more keen to keep the bounding to 100k REN even though it implies that we might have more than the “hard” limit of 10,000 DN. I don’t see it as a problem. Greater decentralization is key, while avoiding increase the entry barrier. I doubt we will be ever reaching this 10k DN anyway; or if we do; it means REN is attractive and that fees are more than decent.
I also understand that the RIP18 will inflate the supply of REN of about 180M REN to funds REN Foundation treasury. However all these new REN won’t hit the market at once; but rather be used at a slow pace to launch initiative that deserves to be funded. If the projet is again picking up some nice steam; this increase of supply won’t be a problem. (And if there is a “trust issue” the funds can be vested with a specific unlocking planning - to ensure that the 180M won’t be used within the first year but across X years).
I don’t want to re-start the entire debat; I’ll vote with what I trully believe is the best based on the different options that were discussed and proposed in this thread.
Thank you.
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Thank you for your input! I encourage you to post your opinions under the RIP, as that’s when we are no longer deciding how to form the options, but actually deciding what to vote on.